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With the European Union’s (EU) Eastern neighbours 
having been embroiled in fatal frictions, four conflicts 
remain simmering in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transnistria. Having surfaced in the form 
of irredentist movements at the time of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, all of them became ‘inter-state’ 
conflicts (Vasilyan 2013). Branded as ‘frozen’, 
paradoxically, they reignite every now and then, leading 
to open confrontations and loss of human lives. Examples 
are the wars between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2016. With Ukraine 
having recently become another battle ground for civil 
war and intra-state strife, only Belarus has managed to 
escape the trend.  
It is, therefore, not surprising that the 2016 EU 
Neighbourhood Barometer found that the majority of 
respondents in Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
identified ‘peace, security and stability’ as the most 
important value. In Azerbaijan it was ranked second after 
‘freedom of speech’ and in Georgia fourth, preceded by 
‘economic prosperity’, ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘human 
rights’ (EU Neighbourhood Barometer n.d.). This is an 
indication of the insecurity reigning in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood.  
Consequently, there is a need for more appropriate 
solutions to these conflicts than the ones put in place so 
far. This policy brief first discusses the schemes contrived 
to respond to the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. It then proposes 
alternative paths out of the current stalemates. 
Concretely, it recommends political and security 
confidence-building measures and political, economic and 
social remedies. It is argued that these novel policy 
solutions will advance the objective of ‘sustainable peace’ 
promoted in the EU’s Global Strategy.  
Executive Summary 
> The insecurity caused by the unresolved conflicts in 
the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood requires 
immediate solutions.  
> To date, the schemes designed for resolving the 
Abkhazian, South Ossetian, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistrian conflicts have proven unsuccessful.  
> Against the background of tensions between the 
US/EU and Russia, novel solutions hinging on 
security and political confidence-building 
measures, and political, economic and social 
remedies are advised.  
> Confidence-building measures include, among 
others, institutionalizing high-level meetings, 
modifying the OSCE Minsk Group, safeguarding the 
demilitarized zones and sending a permanent 
monitoring to Nagorno-Karabakh. Additional 
measures require creating a longer-term EU-Russia 
monitoring mission for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, adding a ‘civilian’ ‘wing’ to the peace-
keeping mission in Transnistria, capping defence 
expenditures and armaments and using pre-
emptive and preventive measures for all conflicts.  
> In terms of additional remedies, banning ‘hate 
speech’, re-shaping the existing economic patterns 
and supporting SMEs, as well as paving the way for 
visa-free travel to Abkhazians and South Ossetians 
and fostering infrastructural links would be useful 
measures.   
> The recommendations aim at achieving the type of 
‘sustainable peace’ that the EU champions in its 
Global Strategy.  
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Existing schemes for resolving the frozen conflicts  
To solve the four conflicts, several schemes for conflict 
resolution were initially established. The Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Budapest 
summit in 1994 created the Minsk Group for the 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. France was 
nominated as a co-chair at the 1996 OSCE Lisbon summit 
after the initial co-chairmanship of Sweden resulted in 
tensions with Russia related to the parallel scheduling of 
meetings in different venues (De Waal 2003). Sweden 
nevertheless remained a participating state, together with 
Germany, Italy, Finland, Belarus and Turkey. The US joined 
as a third co-chair in 1997 as desired by Azerbaijan. The EU 
has not extended any financial assistance to Nagorno-
Karabakh, although, paradoxically, funding has been 
provided to Azerbaijan for the reconstruction of war-torn 
areas (Vasilyan 2013).  
Russia, the US, Germany, France and the UK have been 
members of the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary 
General. This French initiative was set up in Geneva in 
1993 to contribute to the resolution of the Abkhazian 
conflict. The ‘Geneva process’ launched subsequently 
created a complex peace-keeping mechanism. The OSCE 
would liaise with the United Nations Organisation Mission 
in Georgia (UNOMIG), which would, in turn, observe and 
assist the operation of the Russian-led Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) forces.  
The South Ossetian conflict was managed by the Joint 
Control Commission (JCC) created in 1992 as a 
quadrilateral peace-keeping body composed of Georgian, 
Russian, North and South Ossetian representatives. In 
2001, the European Commission, together with France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, became an observer of the 
JCC Economic Working Group. The EU has been the 
primary donor to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a 
result of the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, 
these frameworks were dismantled and the European 
Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) was 
instituted as a civilian peacekeeping mission with Russia’s 
agreement. To reach settlement, a new Geneva process 
was launched with the participation of Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian representatives.  
Since the signature of the cease-fire agreement regarding 
Transnistria in 1992, a peacekeeping force consisting of 
Russian, Moldovan, Transnistrian and Ukrainian military 
observers has been present on the ground. The ‘5+2’ 
format with the participation of Russia, Moldova, 
Transnistria, Ukraine, the OSCE as well as the EU and the 
US as observers has been designed to enforce the 
implementation of the agreement. The EU Border 
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) has 
been monitoring and advising on the implementation of 
the Joint Declaration on certain customs regime issues 
since 2005. The EUBAM oversees trade and transportation 
activities and facilitates cross-border cooperation and 
confidence-building.  
Originally, ‘tectonic shifts’ in the international system 
marked by the change from bipolarity to multipolarity led 
to the eruption of the above-mentioned conflicts. 
Nowadays, however, global and regional challenges such 
as terrorism and migration have come to predominate 
over them. Meanwhile, the existing schemes have proven 
inadequate for the resolution of these conflicts. The 
aggravated tensions between the US and the EU, on the 
one hand, and Russia, on the other, have been manifested 
in a series of schisms. These include contending security 
alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). Other examples are alignments in the form of 
Georgia-US, Armenia-Russia, Azerbaijan-Turkey (Vasilyan 
2010) and Belarus-Russia strategic partnerships and even 
the split allegiances of Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, 
several problems pertaining to the existing schemes have 
loomed large. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk 
Group has exhibited internal dissonance related to the 
interaction between the co-chairing mediators. As for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EUMM has been 
constrained more to an observing than brokering body 
due to the rejection by the de facto states and Russia to 
access the territories (Vasilyan 2013). The EU’s approach 
to resolving the Transnistrian conflict has been technical, 
that is, not addressing the security, political, economic and 
social issues underpinning the conflict and obstructing its 
resolution (Vasilyan, forthcoming). As a result, these 
conflicts remain ‘sore’ with their propensity to ‘heal’ 
becoming questionable.  
Meanwhile, long-term peace in Eurasia can only be the 
result of a recalibration of the adopted policies and 
positions of the external entities by back-pedalling and 
crafting more cooperative security arrangements. The 
concrete recommendations made in the following sections 
of the policy brief intend to provide ways – hereby 
understood as security and political confidence-building 
measures – and means – political, economic and social 




Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
Novel Solutions to Resolv  th  Frozen Conflicts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood  
© Syuzanna Vasilyan 
CEPOB # 2.18 - Fe ruary 2018 
 
Security and political confidence-building 
The de facto states have been presenting obstacles for 
Georgia, Moldova and as of recently Ukraine in view of 
their willingness to integrate into NATO and the EU. The 
tightening of sanctions against Russia by the EU has 
further denigrated its reputation on the global scene and 
increased the reluctance of several parties to comply with 
the Six-Point agreement or the Minsk agreements for the 
resolution of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts 
and the crisis in Ukraine, respectively. Despite Georgia’s 
establishment of the Ministry of Reintegration in 2008 – 
renamed into Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality 
in 2014 –, no breakthrough has been achieved. As Russia 
has been gaining the upper hand in Syria and Libya – by 
tilting the weight in favour of the government as opposed 
to the opposition-led forces – these developments offer a 
bigger bargaining chip against the US/EU (member states). 
The tying of these advances to the conflicts in the EU’s 
Eastern neighbourhood has been a game played by the 
great powers vying for relative power through proxy wars. 
This necessitates systemic solutions to be found between 
the US/EU and Russia over the Eurasian conflicts, which 
might be produced by relying on more comprehensive 
quid pro quo deals. To be sustainable, it is essential that 
the latter are amenable to all the parties.  
To that end, novel security and political confidence-
building need to be encouraged in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood. First, for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
while the Minsk Group co-chair countries have held 
separate meetings with the presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, this has signalled incoherence within the 
format (Vasilyan 2013). Coordination among the co-
chairing countries should be required within the frames of 
the OSCE. Second, high-level meetings between the 
warring parties should not only be organized ad hoc (such 
as emergency and contingency-led meetings), but become 
more frequent and institutionalized. Moreover, these 
meetings should also include representatives of de facto 
states as well as of the co-chairing countries. Third, the 
format of the Minsk Group could be revised since the co-
chairs who are ‘shadow’ high-level diplomats do not seem 
to enjoy leverage at the elite level and legitimacy at 
societal level. Instead, the mandate for mediation should 
fall under the prerogatives of Foreign Ministers or at least 
Deputy Foreign Ministers of the co-Chairing countries. 
Fourth, the established demilitarized zones should be 
respected via international guarantees under the 
protection of the OSCE and the UN: this has not been the 
case in Karabakh where clashes have taken place. Such 
guarantees would also be a test case for a potential 
security rapprochement. Finally, a permanent monitoring 
mission with access to the territories under the aegis of 
the UN should be deployed. This could be more effective 
than a leading role for the OSCE, given the UN’s broader 
membership compared to the OSCE, a platform where the 
US and Russia have traditionally been in conflict. The UN 
umbrella could also be more efficient than that of the EU, 
which has been viewed as a biased outsider not favoured 
by the de facto state authorities. This has been due to the 
Union’s support for ‘territorial integrity’ at the expense of 
the ‘right of people to self-determination’ in the cases of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria and prima face 
contradictory rhetoric pertaining to Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Vasilyan 2013).  
In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EUMM’s short-term 
mandate that is extended more or less annually does not 
bestow a strategic approach to conflict resolution 
(Vasilyan 2013). The incapacity of the monitoring team to 
access the areas affected by the conflict diminishes its 
potency. A longer-term joint civilian monitoring mission 
with a Russian peacekeeping contingent – even if purely 
humanitarian – or a unified observer team could better 
serve the ultimate goal of finding common ground.  
With the three South Caucasian states having been 
incrementally augmenting their military budget, in 
particular Azerbaijan, the level of defence expenditure 
should be capped. The OSCE could set a binding 
percentage on all of its member states, including, among 
others, Russia and the Eastern neighbours of the EU. The 
ceilings related to the acquisition and usage of military 
equipment, as well as the amounts that may be used for 
that purpose, should be fixed and enforced, for instance 
through strict observation of the Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe Treaty, which the South Caucasian states 
have been transgressing (Vasilyan forthcoming). This 
would curb the ongoing arms race and escalation.  
Pre-emptive and preventive measures should be devised 
and developed by the OSCE, possibly in concert with the 
UN and the EU, for the resolution of all the frozen conflicts. 
The added value of the UN is that it is the most inclusive 
multilateral organisation comprising all states who have 
stakes in the conflicts. The asset that the EU can bring to 
the table is related to not having a direct stake in the 
respective conflicts.  
In relation to Transnistria, a ‘civilian’ security ‘wing’ could 
be added to the existing military peace-keeping mission. 
An agreement between the EU and the involved parties, 
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especially Russia, could make the mission better equipped 
to tackle the conflict.  
On the political front, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, first, after the war of April 2016, a new agreement 
was to be negotiated, as the cease-fire agreement signed 
in 1994 no longer reflects the same security and political 
reality on the ground. Acquisition of more wealth due to 
the sale of energy resources has made Azerbaijan less 
willing to compromise and more prone to use force, with 
Armenia responding proportionally. Due to constant 
cease-fire violations and skirmishes across the Line of 
Contact, hundreds of military and civilian deaths are 
recorded annually. Second, a timeline should be 
introduced for the implementation of all points of the 
agreements (modified versions of the Basic or Madrid 
Principles for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and the Six-Point agreement for the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian conflicts). Such benchmarking would 
presume more precision regarding compliance with the 
commitments made. Third, ‘naming and shaming’ should 
be used in the monitoring process after detecting which 
party has first violated the cease-fire. While the 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission sent by 
the EU in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia war 
revealed that Georgia instigated the outbreak of the war, 
no such mission was deployed after the April 2016 war 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, with respect to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, the EU adopted a policy of non-
recognition (of the declared independence), while still 
engaging with them. Conversely, no policy of engagement 
has been pursued on Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, while 
political dialogue has been held with Abkhaz and Ossetian 
officials by the European Parliament Delegations and by 
the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, 
there have been no visits to Karabakh (Vasilyan 2013). This 
has a priori strengthened Russia’s position. A policy of 
engagement is deemed as urgent if the EU is eager to 
endorse an ‘integrated’ and ‘comprehensive’ approach to 
conflict resolution hailed in the Global Strategy.   
Concerning the potential political endeavours for the 
resolution of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, 
the EU could impose arms restrictions/embargos on its 
own member states, which sell weapons particularly to 
Georgia. With Russia bewildered by the postures of Poland 
and the Baltic states and by the NATO and EU membership 
aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine, a unified and 
tempered position would have to be achieved within the 
EU. Meanwhile, EU member states vary in terms of their 
friendliness towards Russia, ranging from Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy as ‘doves’, on the one 
hand, and the UK, Poland and the Baltic states as ‘hawks’, 
on the other, with France and Germany falling in between 
(On 2014). Considering such a discrepancy among its 
member states, the EU is not likely to garner much 
credibility in the EaP countries and the de facto states.  
Political, economic and social remedies  
Considering the political, economic and social 
underpinning of the broader confidence-building 
measures, and starting with a look at political matters, the 
recurrent belligerent rhetoric emanating from Azeri 
President Aliyev contradicts the spirit of negotiations. 
Moreover, it aggravates the fears of Armenians about the 
return of internally displaced Azeris and refugees. 
Accompanied by bellicose tactics, this discourse is 
perceived as a threat. It is feared that repopulation, 
gerrymandering and discrimination could lead to a 
deterioration of the life of Armenians in Nagorno-
Karabakh and even to ethnic cleansing. The latter is 
attributed to the reinforced kinship between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan with the Turkish army offering trainings and 
Erdogan supporting Azerbaijan’s military actions over 
Karabakh during the April 2016 war. Given the memory of 
the Armenian genocide, the perceived threats to survival 
among Armenians have intensified. While this derails 
potential reassurance of cohabitation for the Armenian 
population, ‘hate speech’ should be banned by the OSCE, 
CoE and the UN.  
Second, although Azerbaijan degraded the mandate of the 
OSCE office in Baku to that of a project coordinator and 
later closed it, no proportionally responsive step has been 
taken by the organization. The OSCE should suspend 
Azerbaijan’s vote, if not voice until it has shown 
appropriate behaviour. Conversely, the CoE has de facto 
approved of Azerbaijan’s electoral malpractices, after 
corruption of European officials through ‘caviar 
diplomacy’ (European Stability Initiative 2012). Arguably, 
the CoE should take a similar stance towards Azerbaijan as 
towards Belarus. As all the pipelines (with shares held by 
Western companies) constructed to pump and carry oil 
and gas connect to Western Europe (and none to the East), 
Azerbaijan’s potential ‘retaliation’ is not likely to lead to 
negative repercussions in terms of supply cut.  
Lastly, the EU’s neglect of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian 
practices, especially the referenda on constitutional 
amendments held in 2009 and 2016 to secure further 
consolidation of power for the ruling Aliyev family, have 
also decreased the hope of finding a peaceful resolution to 
the Karabakh conflict. Reflected in the EU’s retreat from 
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the expected normative rhetoric/stance coupled with non-
use of conditionality this has led to further 
disenchantment with the EU’s role as a harbinger of 
democracy and peace (Vasilyan forthcoming). In the 
current circumstances of concomitant regress with 
democracy in Turkey, which as a kin country has 
represented a model for Azerbaijan, the EU’s insistence on 
values is fundamental for asserting its ‘moral power’ 
(Vasilyan forthcoming). Beyond curbing consolidation of 
authoritarianism in Azerbaijan such a venture would be a 
pathway for guaranteeing human security, as advocated 
by the EU.  
In terms of their economy, the de facto states are 
marginalized and, thus, dependent on external supplies. 
Concretely, Transnistria’s population has been suffering 
from poverty due to the economy’s reliance on farming 
and poor infrastructure. Russia remains the single provider 
of assets through loans, subsidies and gas to Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Transnistria; in the case of Karabakh 
Armenia and the Armenian diaspora is a benefactor. 
Therefore, a reversal in the adopted preferences and 
existing dependence of the de facto states would envisage 
substitution of this economic pattern. Otherwise, Russia 
will continue to be the only outlet for the de facto states 
for social (work) and economic (trade) exchanges. For 
example, in the case of Transnistria, the EU could help 
Moldova to pay off its debt to Gazprom and make it less 
dependent on Russia by increasing supplies from Romania. 
While preferential trade arrangements have been offered 
by the EU to Transnistrian companies registered in 
Moldova, the latter has been lenient towards Transnistria. 
Since Georgia has signed a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU as well, an identical 
treatment by the Georgian government could permit 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian companies to benefit from 
it. Such a posture could aid the de facto states 
communities and foster a rapprochement.  
As for Nagorno-Karabakh, whereas Azerbaijan is neither 
inclined to having a DCFTA with the EU conditioned upon 
membership in the World Trade Organization nor to seek 
engagement with Karabakh, European enterprises could 
cooperate with companies in the de facto state. Thereby 
the EU should support small and medium-size 
entrepreneurship (SME) in the de facto states. This will 
most likely only work if the cartel-like political-economic 
nexus, which characterizes the economic reality in all the 
de facto states, is outrooted. Structural changes within the 
‘patron’ states could stimulate this. After all, the political 
leaders in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well 
as the corporations, have maintained ties with Moscow. In 
Karabakh they are (partially) owned by the political clique 
in the de facto state and/or Armenia. 
As far as social matters are concerned, the demographic 
factor is key to reconciliation. The bulk of the citizens of 
Transnistria carry Moldovan, Ukrainian and Russian 
passports; South Ossetia is mainly home to Ossets, 
Abkhazia is more multicultural with citizens having been 
acquiring Russian passports, Karabakh Armenians have 
Armenian passports. With Georgia benefiting from a visa-
free regime with the EU, this is likely to have limited utility 
for the de facto states since European governments do not 
allow issuing Schengen visas to residents of Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Crimea who possess Russian passports. 
As an incentive, the Georgian government has considered 
offering biometric Georgian passports to citizens of de 
facto states, allowing them to take advantage of the 
agreement. The opportunity of free travel to the EU – to 
be approved by its member states – may lead to a better 
disposition of the de facto state residents vis-à-vis the 
Union. In this mode, the EU should take a leading role by 
facilitating people-to-people contacts in order to find a 
way out of the present impasse. This should go hand in 
hand reinvigoration of the Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) hub.  
Although technical at first glance, these efforts may 
become even more important in light of Armenia’s 
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, which was a 
choice based on security considerations (Vasilyan 2016). 
Rather than falling prey to Azerbaijan’s refusal to embark 
on regional cooperation with Armenia in any policy sphere 
and submitting to the blackmail related to energy, which 
has resulted in Turkish opposition to open the border and 
re-establish diplomatic relations with Armenia (Vasilyan 
forthcoming), the EU should abide by its principles. By re-
focusing on these politically ‘low’ issues, instead of 
pursuing muscle-flexing exercises with Russia in ‘high’ 
politics, the Union could win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
populations of the de facto states. 
Conclusion 
As the existing schemes for resolving the conflicts of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistria have proven futile, this policy brief proposes a 
series of novel solutions. These are channelled along the 
dimensions of security and political confidence-building 
measures and political, economic and social remedies. 
Even if the US, EU member states and Russia will be drivers 
of the tit-for-tat deals in Eurasia and the Middle East, the 
latter should appeal to the ‘appetite’ of all the parties.  
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Specifically, it is recommended to ensure coherence, 
institutionalize high-level meetings among the warring 
parties, change the composition of the OSCE Minsk Group, 
safeguard the demilitarized zones, and establish a 
permanent monitoring mission for the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moreover, it is vital to set 
ceilings on the defence expenditures, acquisition and 
usage of armaments by the South Caucasian parties, and 
make use of pre-emptive and preventive measures for all 
conflicts. In addition, it is desirable to negotiate a new 
case-fire agreement, introduce a timeline for meeting the 
undertaken commitments, resort to ‘naming and shaming’ 
against the party that violates the cease-fire, and adopt a 
policy of engagement for Nagorno-Karabakh. The creation 
of a joint EU-Russia monitoring mission for Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia would fix the EUMM’s inability to access the 
de facto states. The EU could impose an arms embargo on 
its member states selling weapons to Georgia. Augmenting 
the military mission deployed in Transnistria with a civilian 
layer would improve its capacity.  
In terms of political, economic and social remedies, ‘hate’ 
speech resonating from Azerbaijan should be prohibited 
by the OSCE, CoE and the UN. Azerbaijan’s vote, if not 
voice, in the OSCE and CoE could be suspended. The EU 
should condemn Azerbaijan’s authoritarian practices and 
defend human security. The EU could help the de facto 
states diminish their social and economic dependence on 
Russia. Georgia could become more accommodating of 
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian enterprises. EU member 
states could allow issuing Schengen visas to the residents 
of the de facto states holding Russian passports. Instead of 
being entangled in frictions with Russia, the EU’s return to 
promoting functional issues, such as mobility and 
transportation linkages, would be more valuable. In this 
mode, the EU could attain ‘strategic autonomy’, as 
pledged in its Global Strategy and contribute to 
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